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the consummation of this function. Any question as to the mode of obtaining the
evidence is collateral. Where it is a question of deprivation of liberty by incarceration,
payment of a penalty, or forfeiture of property, the courts' solicitude for the defendant, merely as a matter of policy, is justifiable. Where, however, none of these
issues is at stake, the reasons for extending the exclusion rule are not apparent.
Insurance-Interpretation of Public Liability Policy-[Ohio].-The plaintiff
agreed with her brother, the defendant, to pay the expenses of a trip in the latter's
automobile to see their father. Because of the defendant's negligent driving, the plaintiff sustained injuries for which she recovered damages against the defendant,' the
court holding that she was not a guest under the Ohio "guest statute."' 2 She then
sought recovery against the defendant's insurer under a public liability policy, the
insurer contending that the plaintiff was a "passenger for a consideration" within the
clause denying the insurer's liability to such persons. Held, for the plaintiff, that she
was not a "passenger for a consideration" within the meaning of the policy. Beer v.
Beer.3
Since in the original suit against her brother the plaintiff was held not to be a
"guest," the contention of the insurance company that she must be a "passenger for a
consideration," would effectuate its apparent purpose to prevent any person riding in
an insured's car from recovering against an insurance company under a public liability
policy. Even though an insurance company could prove that its actual purpose in
inserting the restrictive clause was to deny its liability to all riders in the insured's
car, courts may hold with perfect logic that "one may be a passenger in an automobile
without being a guest ....or a passenger for hire in the legal sense of the word,"4
and may allow such residual class of riders to recover damages against an insurer.
But it requires skillful sailing to steer between these two obstacles to recovery
against insurance companies, since escape from one horn of the dilemma is likely to
impale the plaintiff on the other. Much depends, therefore, on the definition of the
phrase "paSsenger for a consideration." Courts differ in their definition of this term.
Thus in some jurisdictions a rider falls in this category if it appears only that he
agreed prior to the trip to contribute to the expenses of running the car.5 By this
criterion the plaintiff in the instant case could not recover against the insurance company. An alternative test requires that the passenger must have agreed to contribute more than merely the running expenses of the car or his share thereof; he must
also have shared the cost of wear and tear on the car. 6 The Ohio court seems to have
Beer v. Beer, 52 Ohio App. 276, 3 N.E. (2d) 702 (1935).
"The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not
be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported
without payment therefor .... unless such injuries or death are caused by the wilful or wanton
misconduct of such operator ......" Ohio Gen'l Code, § 63o8-6.
3 16 N.E. (2d) 413 (Ohio 1938).
4 Knutson v. Lurie, 217 Iowa i92, 251 N.W. x47 (1933).
s Reed v. Bloom, iS F.Supp. 6oo (Okla. 1936); Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America
v. Lee, 232 Ky. 556, 24 S.W. (2d) 278 (x930).
6 Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation v. Olson, 87 F. (2d) 465 (C.C.A. 8th 1937);
Gross v. Kubel, 315 Pa. 396, 172 Atl. 649, 95 A.L.R. 146 (1934). Cf. Jensen el al. v. Canadian
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applied this test in the instant case. It is noteworthy in passing that paying passengers
are more likely to be included in the category of "passengers for a consideration" when
7
they are strangers to the operator.
In dealing with the legislative obstacle to recovery, courts seem to be uncertain
whom to include as guests under statutes similar to that in Ohio.8 Since the statute is
in derogation of the common law, many courts require the strict construction that one
who makes a payment of any kind is not a guest within the legislative intent.9 Whether
such a strict construction is appropriate should depend on the reasons for enacting the
statute. If the purpose of the statute is to deny damages to the ungrateful "dog that
bites the hand that feeds him,"°0 perhaps recovery should be allowed against the
owner where the passenger has contributed any money, since in such a case the ingratitude is not so base. But the more generally conceded purpose of such statutes
is to "rid the courts of litigation arising out of automobile accidents in which close
relatives and associates sue others and engage in what is in reality a collusive suit for
the ultimate spoliation of an insurance company,",, and to prevent such close associates from "pooling" issues to exact tribute from an insurance company."12 Thus,
those courts are justified which include in the guest category a friend who contributes
toward expenses.' 3 The principal case would seem to afford an ideal situation for such
a collusive suit.
Insurance companies dislike the general recognition of this residual class of persons
who may recover against them. It seems odd, therefore, that they should continue
to seek immunity under judicial construction of the terms "guest" and "passenger for
a consideration" in statutes and policies, when they could insert explicit statements
in their policies that liability extends only to persons not riding in the insured's car.
It is possible, however, that such a blunt and unambiguous denial of protection would
render liability policies less salable to the canny public.
Indemnity Co., 98 F. (2d) 469 (C.C.A. 9th 1938) with Park v. National Casualty Co., 222
Iowa 861, 270 N.W. 23 (1936).
7Orcutt v. Erie Indemnity Co., 114 Pa. Super. 493, 174 Atl. 625 (1934); Park v. National
Casualty Co., 222 Iowa 861, 270 N.W. 23 (1936).
8 See note 2 supra.
9 Smith v. Clute, 277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E. (2d) 455 (1938); Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. (2d)
245, 44 P. (2d) 478 (I935); Kerstetter v. Elfman, 327 Pa. 17, 192 At. 663 (1937); Campbell v.
Campbell, io4 Vt. 468, x62 At. 379 (1932).

1oCrawford v. Foster, izo Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841 (I93o). Massachusetts courts have
adopted a rule, independently of statute, substantially the same as the guest statutes. In
Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. i68 (1917), one of the earliest cases expounding
the rule, the court seems to view the doctrine as an application of the rule that damages may
not be recovered against a gratuitous balee for simple negligence: that "justice requires" a
showing of greater negligence.
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